Hello Again...Part Deux

Hello hello, hope everyone has been doing well. As promised, I have returned to provide you, my constituent base, with some well-deserved reading pleasure. While over at The Monkey Cage, John Side takes note of some recent research by Chris Karpowitz on Nixon's daily intake of media through staff-supplied summeries, which has subsequently sparked a fire under my ass to post again on my own recent research. On the agenda for today, I will be posting my (slightly overdue) abstract regarding my current work in progress, an examination of Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy, specifically, Sino-American rapprochement. Without further delay,

Topic: Confronting a potential rogue state: A historical analysis of Sino-American talks during the Nixon administration

The character of leaders is tested by their willingness to persevere in the face of uncertainty and to build for a future they can neither demonstrate nor fully discern.

-Henry Kissinger, White House Years


In successfully initiating diplomatic talks with Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung), China's leader, and Zhou Enlai (Chou Enlai) [1], China's Prime Minister, some thirty years ago, Nixon and his National Security Advisor (NSA) Henry Kissinger, set a precedent in US diplomacy previously unheard of — namely, the rapprochement of US relations with a country, which was simultaneously viewed, both as an emerging super power as well as a potential rogue state. This epoch, while not only providing scholars with an invaluable compilation of historical records, has also shed light on the overall delicacy required for such talks to prove fruitful. Ranging from prior diplomatic blunders, to the establishment of secret back channels, and especially the famous Shanghai communiqué, Nixon and Kissinger constantly found themselves walking a diplomatic tightrope during Sino-American talks. Other factors that were of great importance were the ad hoc political ideologies of these two countries — was Nixon, an outspoken enemy of communism, to trust Mao, a known communist revolutionary? Or would the extraordinary negotiating tactics of Zhou Enlai, hardened from exposure to political infighting during the New Culture Movement, pose a challenge even to those of Kissinger? There is no doubt that such thoughts crossed the minds of both Nixon and Kissinger - both men knew that for the sake of U.S. security (and possibly even the stability of the world stage itself), they had to engage in diplomatic initiatives with a nation state that they knew little-to-nothing about. As Margaret Macmillan stated, "such questions matter in international relations, especially between two countries when each is convinced that it is the more important" (Macmillan xxi).
Today, despite the numerous efforts by transnational entities such as the United Nations, and the international community in general, to highlight a critical need for interstate diplomacy, conflict still exists. Yet this phenomenon simultaneously accentuates the delicacy involved in diplomatic talks. Underlying factors such as competing ideologies or shifts in regional balances of power, along with the expansion of terrorist regimes and rogue states, must all be equally considered. Not to mention, the special attention directed to the official dialogue utilized during diplomatic exchanges. Each of these elements are equally important, and have revitalized a crucial need to study the diplomatic accomplishments of yesterday, in the hope that drawing generalizations with the circumstances of today can benefit nations of tomorrow

[1] From Xia, xv: Chinese names and places are rendered throughout the text in the Hanyu Pinyin system of transliteration. Some names are more familiar to Western readers in their traditional Wade-Giles form. In such cases, the Wades-Giles is given in parentheses after the first use of the Pinyin, e.g., Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and Zhou Enlai (Chou Enlai)

Truely A Zero-Sum Game

Currently I am working on my undergrad thesis (abstract should be up shortly) regarding the Sino-American relations under the Nixon Administration. Subsequently this leads to how the Nixon White House initiated diplomacy with China, whom at the time, was considered by some to be a potential rogue state. After completing a historical analysis, I can then hopefully draw generalizations on how the Obama Administration can carry out diplomacy with current day rogue states. But this brings up another point which can be contemplated. We can hypothetically view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a two player, zero-sum situation, contending that both players can take three possible actions, A, B, or C. Yet, due in part to us not knowing the exact intentions of these two states (one possibility being Israel's usage of it's nuclear weapon capabilities), we can further contend that these two state would operate as rogue states. Needless to say, if we were to run this scenerio utilizing a zero-sum model, the winning of one player would in turn, come as a loss to the other (Pareto efficiency/optimality).

But in reality, I think an option these two countries have at their disposal is one that won't attain Pareto optimality; that option is dialogue. Avi Shlaim, an Israeli historian, has recently claimed in an interview over at the Economist.com, that Israel is the "stumbling block to peace." This point has been reiterated countless times by countless scholars, yet conflict still exists. But I believe the best answer is diplomacy. Not back-door diplomacy, but a combination of numerous diplomatic initiatives - economic, formal, even global. As media has drawn international attention to this conflict, global diplomacy has already been accomplished. The politcal leaders of these two countries should then initiate open, formal diplomacy. And free trade would, in turn, force a policy of détente. Not Israel establishing security forces across the West Bank, or Hamas increasing it's attacks on Israeli forces, just plain old school diplomacy (with a modern twist).

man it is late (or early depending on your locale)... Adios